At a time of great health, economic and social crises, the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces made a strange decision to spark a crisis in the armed forces that has always been a model for civil service engagement. for their missions and also for our people, even if the political power does not treat them as it should, given their importance for national stability and as a reserve for situations of serious difficulty. This ability was demonstrated in recent years when two army generals were seized to sequentially seize the SNPCE with SEF and oversee the distribution of antiviral vaccines, this time with a vice admiral.
I recently gave a short interview to the PUBLIC about statements by the Minister of National Defense about reforms in the armed forces that I did not want to believe in, and so I did my best not to get caught up in an amazing story based on copying models from some NATO countries.
In the twentieth century, the trend towards copying appeared in 1911 when the legislature decided to copy the Swiss model, in 1926 when it was written that the most advanced countries (France and the United Kingdom) model should be followed, and as early as 1937 seek a solution for a Metropolitan Army and a Colonial Army on the eve of World War II; The army was not integrated until the Reformation of 1958. In the 1950s we began to follow the NATO model for the Metropolitan Army, although between 1961 and 1975 we had adapted to the counterguerrilla forces with great flexibility. Then we returned to NATO’s solutions with successive reforms. It is worth remembering that I have worked with NATO for several years and each country, while following similar models, always takes into account its geography, national responsibilities and international obligations. So the solutions are not all the same.
However, let’s move on to the duties of the chief military officers. The higher-ranking military chief must be an example of character, leadership qualities, forget the corporatism of his branch of origin and win the trust of those who depend on him, in addition to the culture and the necessary specialist knowledge. and you have to do some gymnastics to have a good understanding of political power without pretending to be a copy of it. But it will never accomplish its mission if it does not earn the trust of those who depend on it.
In this strange process, there were times when the leaders of the FA branches opposed the suggestion that they meet very late. A collective shock wave came from former military chiefs with a very solid argument that our own President of the Republic had been moderate in his words, asked for the utmost care in the measures taken, called CSDN, but went further, called State Council, what for that kind of matters is not common.
How is it possible that this happened at such a difficult phase in national life, when the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, among other duties, already has the FA Joint Task Force, which has never failed in the missions it received? and did you do it well? Why do you want to be the only interlocutor of the MDN and remove competencies from the CCEM? Why should you duplicate structures or empty EMs from branches? Do the heads of the three branches of the FA, which depend on the President of the Republic, their commander in chief, fail to deploy with the MDN? There is something very bad about all of this, and there seems to have been little consideration for the branches, which has been added to previous practices and leaves a mark of great attraction to power.
What conclusions can be drawn? My answer is in the title! The chief of staff of the armed forces must be a commander who deserves the full trust of his colleagues and subordinates.
The author writes according to the new orthographic convention